Exegetical Note: Aikin's "The Problem of Worship"

I like arguments. I particularly like arguments with a formal structure made up of a numbered propositions and inferential relations. As is apparent from other posts on this blog, I also like constructing maps that represent the inferential relationships between the numbered propositions.

Given all these likes, one would think that Scott Aikin’s article “The Problem of Worship” would be right up my alley. After all, it consists of 15 numbered propositions, linked together by a series of inferential relationships. Alas, the article is not entirely satisfactory because the formal argument that Aikin presents suffers from a number of deficiencies.

I think there are three main reasons for these deficiencies (i) typographical errors result in conclusions being drawn from the wrong premises; (ii) inconsistent use of terminology leads to conclusions that are unrelated to the premises; and (iii) two major conclusions are reached which, although related, are distinct.

I’ll give examples of each of these problems below. On the whole, I don’t think any of these deficiencies substantially detract from the persuasiveness of Aikin’s article. I wouldn’t discuss it if I thought it without merit. But they do, I think, justify my attempt to reconstruct his argument rather than directly summarise it.


Problem One: Typographical Errors
It is common in philosophical argumentation to state from which premises one is drawing a particular conclusion. Aikin does this at several points in his article (conclusions 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15). The problem is that, on two of these occasions, the premises from which the conclusions are drawn are misidentified. The first example is (10) which states the following (p. 110):

• (10) Therefore, A is not obliged to hold any object to be worthy of worship (from 6 and 9).

The problem is that premises (6) and (9) state the following, respectively:

• (6) If A has no reason to see any property W of X as making X worthy of worship then A is obliged not to worship X.

• (9) Therefore, there are no W-properties any A may reasonably see as making any x worthy of worship.

The difficulty this poses should be apparent. Although (9) is fine, (6) is a principle stating that A is under a positive obligation (duty) not to worship X in certain circumstances. But the conclusion reached is that A is not obliged to hold any object to be worthy of worship (i.e. not worshipping is morally permissible). This is not a conclusion about A’s positive obligations so could not be drawn from premise (6).

The problem is easily corrected. (10) can be drawn from a combination of (5) and (9) because (5) says the following:

• (5) If A is obliged to view X as worthy of worship, then A must have reason to see some property W of X as making X worthy of worship.

Given the facile nature of this correction, I presume the problem is the result of typographical error.

The same basic problem occurs again in relation to (11), which states:

• (11) Therefore, A is obliged not to hold any object to be worthy of worship (from 7 and 9).

This can’t be right because (7) is principle stating when it is reasonable to believe that an entity is worthy of worship, not a principle stating what our positive obligations are with respect to worship. Once again this problem is easily corrected. Premise (6) does state a principle relating to positive obligations, so (11) can be drawn from a combination of (6) and (9).

There is another typographical error in the conclusion when Aikin refers to premises (8) and (9) in relation to evidentialism. I presume he meant to refer to premises (5) and (6).


Problem Two: Inconsistent Use of Terminology
The correction of (11) does highlight another problem with Aikin’s article. As can be seen above, (11) is a conclusion about A’s obligations to hold an entity worthy of worship, whereas (6) is a premise about obligations to worship in general. So even with my correction, (11) cannot properly be drawn from (6). A more general conclusion can reached, viz. “A is obliged not to worship any x”.

There is a way to solve this problem. It requires that we go back to premise (3) which defines what is involved in the act of worship:

(3) For any rational moral agent A, if A worships x, A’s worship is the joint performance of three acts:  

• (a) A is unconditionally obedient to X and to the demands that X’s existence and properties place on A;  

• (b) A views x as absolutely worthy of worship;   

• (c) A performs rituals or communicative acts expressing 3(a) and 3(b)

As can be seen, believing x to be worthy of worship is part and parcel of the act of worshipping, so it would be implied by reaching the more general form of (11). Of course, we could repair this in another way by going back to (6) and changing the principle so that it is restricted to “obliged not to hold x worthy of worship”. The problem is that this approach seems unnecessary.

Allowing for the more general form of (11) does create some downstream problems. In particular it means that the additional argumentation that Aikin offers for (13) is redundant since (13) just states that rational moral agents are obliged not to worship any entities - a conclusion that will have already been reached by (11). I think Aikin is aware of this himself since just after stating (11) in the narrow form, he states (p. 110) “given that we shouldn’t worship God (on 11)”. This is clearly a general claim about worship not a claim about worthiness of worship.

There is another problem arising from terminology. This one relates to the use of the word “unconditional” in premise (3), given above. The inclusion of the word suggests that Aikin thinks the act of worship necessarily involves unconditional obedience. Aikin follows this up by stating (well, to be fair, he does offer an argument) that:

• (4) Unconditional submission to any authority contravenes the requirements of moral agency.

If we accept this premise (and I think we probably should), then it automatically follows that we should not worship any being. Why? Because Aikin has already defined worship as including unconditional obedience (I am assuming obedience and submission are interchangeable).

This is weird because Aikin goes on to stress that conditional obedience is allowable. He then considers whether God possesses any properties that would make him worthy of conditional obedience (he actually refers to worship, not obedience, further muddying the waters). This argumentation seems unnecessary if he thinks worship involves unconditional obedience. Only if he thinks some kind of conditional-obedience-based worship were permissible would it be necessary to consider those arguments.

Thus I would be inclined to correct premise (3) by removing the term unconditional from the definition of worship. This would leave premise (4) intact.



Problem 3: What is the Argument?
A final problem I have with Aikin’s argument is that it seems to mix-up related but distinct arguments and avoid making necessary arguments.

One of these arguments, probably the main one, leads to the conclusion that God does not exist. This conclusion is backed up by (roughly) the following chain of reasoning: there is no being that we are obliged to worship; God is supposed to be worthy of obligatory worship; so there must not be a God.

[Note: This chain of argumentation is problematic given the repairs undertaken above. In particular, if we drop the “unconditional obedience” clause from our definition of worship, then it is possible that there might be some entities who are worthy of worship. Thus we will have to offer an argument more like the following: God is supposed to be worthy of obligatory worship; None of God’s properties make him worthy of obligatory worship; so there must not be a God (at least going by present descriptions of his properties).]

There is also another significant argument about the practical or social implications of the fact that no rational moral agent is allowed to unconditionally surrender to another being. The argument is that since surrender to God would be unconditional, and would involve communicative and ritual acts of worship, it must be the case that communicative and ritual acts of worship are impermissible. Aikin makes this point in premise (12).

I think this is really interesting, but I think it is distinct from the main argument that Aikin is making and so is worth separating out from that argument. Maybe this desire to keep these points separate is just a personal quirk of my own. I am, after all, primarily interested in the socio-political aspects of what Aikin has to say.

A final problem arises from my confusion over whether Aikin is making an argument that is specifically about God or about all possible beings X. The conclusions that he reaches are certainly phrased in terms of “all possible beings X” (see his 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14), but the argumentation he offers focuses on God, not all possible beings.

This problem comes to the fore when Aikin infers (9) from (7) and (8). (9) was stated above and is clearly about the properties possessed by all possible beings. But (7) and (8), and the preceding paragraphs, are clearly about God’s properties. It seems then like an additional argument is needed which would run along the following lines:

• (a) If any being is worthy of (unconditional) worship, then it is God.
• (b) None of God’s properties make him worthy of (unconditional) worship.
• (c) Therefore, it is unlikely that any being is worthy of (unconditional) worship.

This conclusion (c) would then effectively be equivalent to Aikin’s (8).


Conclusion
This exegetical note has been long and, perhaps, uninteresting. I want to be very clear that despite my problems, I enjoyed Aikin’s article and found much of value in it. I’m also aware that I have limited experience and credentials in the great game of philosophy. It may be that Aikin’s argument is coherent and that the problems I have identified are products of my own misunderstanding.

If that is the case, I am willing to be corrected.

Religious Liberty and Tax Exemptions (Part 2)

This post is the second part in a brief series looking at the arguments for and against tax exemptions for religious organisations. The series is inspired by something I read in the book Bargaining with the State by Richard Epstein.

By the end of the previous entry we had derived a principle for assessing the legitimacy of selective changes to government tax policy. That principle was the following:

• Selective changes in taxation must be assessed in terms of just compensation and equal relative gain.

Stated in the abstract the principle makes little sense; stated in the appropriate context it does. The appropriate context is the general theory of the state that was outlined in the previous entry. To recap, the state was seen as the product of a rational bargain (social contract) that created a certain “status quo” or “baseline” consisting of rights and entitlements. Changes to that baseline must also garner rational assent through compensation and equal relative share of gains.

In this post, we apply the principle for assessing tax policy to cases involving tax exemptions that seem to affect rights that are part of the baseline in a liberal democratic society. This will lead us to a consideration of one of Epstein’s arguments relating to tax exemptions for religious organisations. Which will, in turn, lead us to a more general argument against the existence of a right to religious liberty.

1. Free Speech and Tax Exemptions

Epstein begins his chapter on tax exemptions and religious liberty by first considering some cases involving tax exemptions and the right to free speech. We can all agree that a right to free speech is part of the status quo of a liberal democratic state. It follows, given our argument in the part one, that any tax exemption that restricted or compromised one’s right to free speech would be unlikely to pass muster.

Epstein looks at several US cases dealing with this issue. I’ll consider just one of these for illustrative purposes. The case is Speiser v. Randall 357 U.S. 513 (1958). It involved a provision of the Californian Constitution that provided property tax exemptions to WWII veterans, provided they signed an oath to not advocate the overthrow of the U.S. or Californian governments. 

This provision was ruled unconstitutional (under the US constitution - in case you are confused) because it essentially amounted to a fine on a certain class of people for exercising their right to free speech. We can state the argument for this conclusion as follows:

• (1) A right to free speech is part of the baseline (or status quo) in a liberal democratic state.

• (2) Selective changes to tax policy from the status quo must be assessed in terms of just compensation and equal relative gain.

• (3) So changes to tax policy that impact upon the right to free speech must be assessed in terms of just compensation and equal relative gain.

• (4) A tax exemption that is conditional upon professing certain political opinions necessarily redistributes wealth from those of one set of views to those of another.

• (5) This essentially fines certain people for exercising their right to free speech.

• (6) There is no corresponding compensation or share of gains for the people who lose out.

• (7) Therefore, this tax exemption is illegitimate.

There are two things to be said about this argument. First, we might express some suspicion of premise 6. Is it really true that there is no corresponding compensation or gain? Could someone not argue that the tax exemption provides an incentive to loyal citizens to join the army and that we are all better off if loyal citizens are defending us?

That counterargument clearly couldn’t work here since the exemption applied retrospectively to WWII veterans. But even prospectively there would be problems: the right to free speech is often seen as foundational in a liberal society, to compromise it in any way would always be problematic.

The second thing to consider about this argument is whether a tax exemption to veterans could ever be legitimate. We have already hinted at the positive answer to this above, but just to draw out the reasoning: we all benefit from (or "are justly compensated for") having military protection, so an exemption which rewards or incentivises people joining the military does not automatically breach our principle of legitimacy.

2. Tax Exemptions and Religious Liberty

The free speech example was a warm-up. It highlights the basic structure of the analysis we undertake whenever there is a selective tax exemption. We can now apply it to cases involving tax exemptions for religious organisations. We begin with a general argument.

• (8) A right to religious liberty is part of the baseline (or status quo) in a liberal democratic system.

• (2) Selective changes to tax policy from the status quo must be assessed in terms of just compensation and equal relative gain (from previous argument).

• (9) Changes to tax policy that impact upon religious beliefs and practices must be assessed in terms of just compensation and equal relative gain.

• (10) The right to RL includes the right to practice different religions or no religion at all.

• (11) A tax exemption for particular types of religious organisation, in a religiously pluralist society, has serious redistributive consequences viz. it takes money from non-believers, or it privileges one religion over another.

• (12) So you cannot have a discriminatory tax exemption for religious organisations, i.e. one that privileges one type of religion or fails to include non-believers.

This argument is relatively straightforward. I suggest that, given our theoretical assumptions about the nature of the state, it is both true and valid. Some questions may be asked, however, about the implications of the conclusion. Specifically, what exactly would a non-discriminatory tax exemption look like? Epstein suggests that an exemption that merely equalises the status of those who practice a religion, when compared to their secular peers, would be non-discriminatory.

So, for example, a tax exemption for educational religious organisations, when there already is a publicly-funded secular system of education, might be deemed legitimate. Why? Because it merely equalises the religious and secular systems of education.

For the sake of argument, we can go along with this. What matters for my purposes is how Epstein applies this general principle -- i.e. that of non-discriminatory tax exemptions -- to a noteworthy case: Bob Jones University vs. United States 461 U.S. 574 (1978).

3. The Bob Jones University Case

The facts and the decision in the case are easily stated. Bob Jones University (BJU) were, as a charitable organisation, entitled to a tax exemption. However, the BJU, for religious reasons, did not permit interracial dating and marriage among its students. In other words, it practiced a form of racial discrimination. The Supreme Court decided that BJU could not keep its tax exemption under these circumstances.

There are two ways to analyse the decision in BJU-case. The first I shall call the “naive way” and it looks something like this:

• (13) BJU had a charitable tax exemption and practiced a form of racial discrimination.

• (14) The court withheld the tax exemption from BJU but not from other similar religious institutions.

• (15) So the court mandated a discriminatory form of tax exemption policy for religious organisations.

• (12) You cannot have a discriminatory tax exemption for religious organisations (from previous argument).

• (16) So the decision is incorrect.

As it stands, this argument is sound: the decision in the BJU-case did, in effect, create a discriminatory system of tax exemptions for religious institutions. By withholding the tax exemption from BJU, it forced the BJU to subsidise other institutions and it did so without any just compensation or reward for the BJU.

But I doubt anybody would be satisfied with this naive analysis. Why not? Well, because it focuses solely on the impact of the decision on the right to religious liberty. It forgets another important part of the status quo: the right to equal protection (which includes, most obviously, a right to non-discrimination on the basis of race). Surely that must be included in our assessment?

We can remedy the defect as follows:

• (17) Equal protection is part of the baseline (or status quo) in a liberal democratic state.

• (18) To reward a racially discriminatory organisation through a tax exemption would damage the right to equal protection.

• (19) Continuance of the tax exemption to BJU would reward a racially discriminatory organisation.

• (20) The right to equal protection trumps the right to religious liberty.

• (21) Therefore, the decision in the BJU-case was correct.

Although this argument rescues the decision in the BJU-case, it does not do so without controversy. The problem comes in the shape premise (20). Although this must be true to justify the conclusion (otherwise we must engage in some strange sort of balancing act), Epstein thinks we have good reason to think the opposite, i.e. to think that religious liberty actually trumps equal protection (at least in this instance).

4. Epstein Contra the BJU-case

Epstein’s argument is derived from the nature of the right to religious liberty. Epstein contends, and I agree, that a right to religious liberty is meaningless if it does not include a right to practice as well as profess religious beliefs. If it only included the latter, then it would be subsumed within the right to free speech.

Epstein then points out that many religious practices are discriminatory (he cites rules on membership of the Catholic clergy as an example) and so if equal protection were allowed to trump religious liberty in cases like the BJU-case, it would make a mockery of the right to religious liberty.

Formally, the argument looks something like this:

• (22) A right to religious liberty covers more than just a right to profess religious beliefs, it covers the right to practice as well.

• (23) Many religious practices are discriminatory (e.g. sex discrimination in Catholicism).

• (24) So lots of tax exemptions would have to be withdrawn in line with the reasoning in the BJU-case (from 23).

• (25) This would illegitimately undermine the right to religious liberty; it would effectively amount to a fine on religious practice without any just compensation.

• (26) So the decision must be wrong.

5. Contra Epstein and the right to Religious Liberty

Epstein’s argument is, no doubt, attractive to some. But for me it highlights the untenability of the separate right (i.e. over-and-above the right to free speech) to religious liberty. I would spell this out as follows.

• (27) Secular law must not discriminate between different religious beliefs and practices (a more general version of the principle embodied in premise 12).

• (28) At least some religious beliefs and practices will clash with secular law (as proven by the BJU-case).

• (29) So in order not to discriminate between religions, the secular legal system would have to accept (perhaps even reward) practices that are contrary to its provisions.

• (30) This would undermine the secular legal system.

• (31) So the right to religious liberty undermines the secular legal system.

This argument strikes me as being sound, given the general theory that has been expounded here and given the specific arguments outlined above. We can see how it relates to Epstein's argument in the following diagram. It implicitly defeats Epstein's claim that the BJU-case was incorrectly decided.

One thing that is unclear is the implications of the argument contra Epstein. I would suggest that a further conclusion can be drawn from it:

• (32) There should not be a right to religious liberty.

But note that this conclusion does not follow from the argument as presented to this point. A further assumption, to the effect that secular law trumps religious rules, would be required for that. I would submit that this assumption is likely to be acceptable to most people living in pluralistic democracies. 

I would further submit that an argument in favour of this assumption is possible. That argument would highlight the impossibility of rational, intersubjective assent to a system of rules centred on supernatural, faith-based claims. And hence the impermissibility of including such rules among the baseline conditions of the state. To put this another way, it would argue that religion is contrary to the epistemology of the social contract theory outlined in part one.

But that argument would be complex and would have to fend-off many objections from evidentialist religious believers. I will not pursue it here since it is little more than a promissory note in my mind. I am content that the assumption will be attractive to most people.

One final issue must be confronted. Does the argument contra the right to religious liberty have disturbing consequences? Would it mandate extreme intolerance towards religious believers?

I would suggest that it does not. The argument simply removes a special right to religious liberty from the baseline of the liberal democratic state; it does not affect the other rights and entitlements included in that baseline. 

Religious believers could still profess and proclaim their beliefs (in accordance with the right to free speech). They could still engage in all practices that do not violate the harm principle. Religious organisations could even engage in discriminatory practices (in accordance with freedom of contract) provided they are not rewarded by the state for doing so.

So despite the dismissal of the right to religious liberty, things would not be too intolerable for the religious.

Religious Liberty and Tax Exemptions (Part 1)

What is the correct legal position with respect to religious beliefs and practices in a liberal democracy? Should there be a right to religious liberty? Should religious organisations be granted tax exemptions? Should such exemptions be withheld if they engage in activities that are contrary to the laws of the land?

To non-believers and secularists like myself, the answers to these questions are straightforward: (i) religious beliefs and practices should be granted no special legal protections over-and-above those granted to other beliefs and practices of all citizens; (ii) there should be no tax exemptions for religious organisations; and, of course, (iii) religious organisations should not be rewarded (through tax exemptions or otherwise) for doing things that are contrary to the secular legal system.

These answers sound fine at a theoretical level. In practice, things are little more difficult. In practice, most liberal democracies do afford some special legal status to religious beliefs and practices (i.e. rights to free exercise and conscience). In practice, secularists would like to avoid excessive intolerance or oppression of religious believers. And so, in practice, convoluted balancing acts are undertaken.

In this brief series, I want to take a more in-depth look at some of the issues arising from the special status of religious belief and practice in liberal democracies. I do so by examining an argument from the libertarian legal theorist Richard Epstein relating to religious tax exemptions. I then use that argument as a springboard for questioning the law relating to religious liberty.

The series comes in two parts. In this first part, we develop a basic theoretical conception of the social contract and derive from it a principle for assessing governmental tax policy. In the second part, we will see how the application of this principle to cases involving tax exemptions for religious organisations highlights the implausibility of a robust right to religious liberty. 

1. Bargaining in General

Epstein’s argument concerning tax exemptions and religious liberty occurs in his book Bargaining with the State. The book develops a general theory of the social contract, and then applies that theory to a series of practical legal issues. Although I do not share Epstein’s libertarian sentiments, I do share his basic theoretical vision of the state. This vision is built on the notion of bargaining. This is something I have covered in detail in previous entries but I’ll summarise its essential elements here.

There are occasions on which two or more people can coordinate their activities and create a social surplus. In other words, they can gain more of something than they could if left to their own devices. But in order for this to take place, a bargain must be struck which determines the distribution of the surplus. 

Here’s an example, one of many which could be adduced. Suppose there are two people, A and B. Suppose A is the producer of some good X and that she values (perhaps due to production costs) X at $7. Suppose B is a potential consumer of X who would be willing to pay up to $15 for X.

Given these conditions, any negotiated exchange of X at a price between $7 and $15 would lead to the creation of a social surplus. Why so? Because A would get something more valuable to them than X, and B would get something more valuable to them than any cash-sum up to $15. The bounds of $7 and $15 represent the baselines or status quo over which the surplus is calculated. 

The bargain thus creates a larger pie of assets that is divided among the parties in different proportions.

2. The Creation of the State

The basic idea of the bargain can be used to build a theoretical model of the state. The picture is, roughly, the following: Rational actors left to fend for themselves without the option of cooperation could achieve a certain degree of personal welfare and security. This would be the “pie” or “surplus” that can be achieved in stateless society.

According to some classic theories, the size of the pie in the stateless society is exceptionally small. Thomas Hobbes, for example, argued that in the state of nature man’s life would be “nasty, poor, brutish and short”. He did so because he believed that without a state with a monopoly on the use of violence there is an unending state of war. The deeper reasons for this are explored in the diagram below (click to enlarge).

Whether Hobbes is right in his pessimism, most would agree that the creation of the state does, in general, enlarge the size of the pie (raise the baseline) compared to the stateless society. This enlarging of the pie would make it mutually advantageous (rationally acceptable) for people to agree to be bound by the regulations imposed by the state. In other words, it would be rational to negotiate a social contract that legitimates the state.

What kind of state would be required to enlarge the pie from what it is like in the state of nature? There are different suggestions. 

A libertarian like Epstein would argue that a very minimalistic state is all that is required. Such a state would have basic legal institutions, legal rules on freedom of contract and property, and some sort of police force and army. Hobbes himself argued that a maximal, authoritarian state (the Leviathan) was needed to lift us out of the war of all against all. The liberal democratic state probably falls somewhere between these extremes.

We do not need to engage with the arguments for and against these different possibilities. We assume that a liberal democratic state is required. This state comes with certain rights and entitlements including, usually, a right to freedom of speech and religion. It will also come with some sort of taxation policy because the state needs to raise revenue to perform its basic functions.

3. Bargaining with the State

Now we come to the crux of the issue. Once the state has been created, it becomes an agent in future bargains and negotiations with its citizens. This is because the situation arrived at after the implementation of the social contract is not some stable, unchangeable state of affairs. Changes in government policy could help to enlarge the size of the pie once again. 

If the government chooses to change its policies in order to enlarge the pie, it enters a new round of bargaining with its citizens. The citizens will be operating within the status quo (or baseline) that has been established by the social contract. Given that the working assumption is that government is the product of rational agreement, the government must ensure that its policy changes do not make people worse off than they are under the existing status quo. This requires just compensation for any losses suffered, and equal relative shares of the new surplus.

What are the implications of all this for changes in tax policy? Most forms of taxation are selective. That is to say, they target certain activities (e.g. work and consumption). But some forms are obviously more selective than others. For example, governments often impose higher taxes on the consumption of certain types of goods (alcohol or cigarettes). The same goes for policies relating to tax exemptions, e.g. exemptions for start-up companies but not established companies.

The crucial point here is that selective changes to tax policy, even if they do enlarge to social pie, necessarily involve the redistribution of assets from one group of citizens to another. This means that those changes constitute a deviation from the status quo. Any such changes must be rendered mutually advantageous by some form of just compensation and equal relative share of gains.

We will be considering examples in the next entry in the series.

4. How to Evaluate Tax Policy

There are a lot of ideas embedded in the preceding paragraphs. In the interests of clarity, we can restate them as a formal argument.

• (1) A legitimate government is one that is mutually advantageous for its citizens, i.e. it creates a social surplus and distributes it fairly.

• (2) Any change in government policy from the existing status quo must be assessed in terms of its ability to satisfy the requirements of mutual advantage (from 1).

• (3) One way to satisfy the requirements of mutual advantage is to ensure that there is just compensation for any losses suffered and equal relative shares of gains.

• (4) So changes in government policy from the existing status quo should be assessed in terms of just compensation and equal relative gain (from 2 and 3).

• (5) Selective changes in taxation are deviations from the status quo because they involve the redistribution of assets.

• (6) So selective changes in taxation must be assessed in terms of just compensation and equal relative gain (from 4 and 5).

This argument, working from a principle for legitimate government based on rational assent, gives us a principle with which we can assess the legitimacy of changes to tax policy given their impact on the status quo. We will put this principle into action in the next entry when looking at the topic of tax exemptions for religious organisations.