The End of Skeptical Theism? (Part 3) - Extreme Moral Skepticism

This post is part of my series The End of Skeptical Theism? For an index, see here.

I am currently working my way through William Hasker's article "All too Skeptical Theism?" which is a critique of Michael Bergmann's preferred brand of skeptical theism. As with all the entries in this series, it is worth referring back to this post on the evidential problem of evil to get a feel for what is a stake in this debate.

In the previous entry, we looked at Bergmann's four skeptical theses (ST1-ST4). Combined, they help Bergmann to undercut the crucial inference in the evidential problem of evil, but they do so at a price. We have already looked at two initial worries. In this entry we will focus on the moral skepticism that is engendered by Bergmann's theses.


1. Farewell to the Design Argument
To say that skeptical theism seriously undermines our moral judgment is nothing new. I have even covered such arguments in the past. However, Hasker takes a strong line on this issue that begins by pointing out an interesting concession made by Bergmann.

Bergmann notes that his skeptical theses (ST1-ST4) crucially undermine any arguments for the existence of God that are based on the identification of an all-things-considered good. He says:*

If the order one sees in the natural world or the joy one witnesses in people's lives is identified as reason to think that there is a good being who is the cause of such things, one is failing to take into account the lessons of ST1-ST4. Given our cognitive limitations, we simply don't know what evils may be entailed by those good things and this prevents us from being able to conclude that they are all-things-considered goods that an omnibenevolent being would bring about.

It is worth pausing to reflect on how sweeping this kind of value skepticism really is. Consider, if one accepts Bergmann's ST1-ST4:

• One cannot accept any design-based argument for the existence of God, be it in terms of biological design or cosmological fine-tuning. Both of those arguments are based on the idea that there are certain states of affairs (e.g. the existence of conscious, rational beings) that are good and that God would wish to realise.

• One cannot accept some types of experience-based arguments that are based on inferring God's goodness from one's experience of nature.

• One must withhold judgment about whether a state of affairs that is a prima facie good/evil is an actual good/evil.

This, Hasker suggests, is a truly extreme variety of moral skepticism.

You can ask: is the skeptical theist really committed to such an extreme position? Hasker argues that they are and that this can be seen when we consider Bergmann's response to a criticism that was first made by Richard Swinburne.

2. Swinburne's Criticism

Swinburne asks us to imagine a case of prima facie gratuitous evil such as the previously-given example of a five-year old girl who was raped and killed by her mother's boyfriend. He takes it that when presented with such an example we would assign a high subjective probability to it being an actual gratuitous evil. This would make the evidential problem of evil a genuine doxastic threat.

Then, along comes a skeptical theist waving around ST1-ST4 and telling us not to be so quick with our talk of doxastic threats. After all:

• (1) We may fail to recognise the existence of some good state of affairs that is made possible, or some evil that is averted, because this instance of evil is not prevented.

• (2) We may fail to grasp the logical connection between this particular evil and some good that is made possible, or some evil that is averted, as a result of its not being prevented.

• (3) We may fail to evaluate properly the moral significance of this evil state of affairs, or of the good that is made possible, or of the evil that is averted, by its not being prevented.

These would reduce our subjective probability assignment and reduce the doxastic threat posed by the evidential problem of evil.

That's fine, but Swinburne points out that ST1-ST4 could easily be employed to make the opposite argument. As follows:

• (4) We may fail to recognise the existence of some additional evil state of affairs that is made possible, or some good that is prevented, by this instance of evil.

• (5) We may fail to grasp the logical connection between this particular evil and some additional evil that is made possible, or some good that is prevented, as a result of its not being prevented.

• (6) We may fail to evaluate properly the moral significance of this evil state of affairs, or of the further evil that is made possible, or the good that is prevented, by its not being prevented.

These would cause us to increase our subjective probability assignment, thus making the evidential problem even more of a problem.

3. Bergmann's Response

Bergmann responds by pointing out that Swinburne has misunderstood the skeptical argument. It is not that skeptical theism causes us to lower our probability assignments when confronted with prima facie evils; it is that skeptical theism entirely discredits any such probability assignments.

Hasker thinks this is right insofar as it goes. If Bergmann wants to undermine the evidential problem of evil, then he really does need to entirely discredit any assessments we would be inclined to make about prima facie evils.

To see this, imagine that ST1-ST4 only caused us to lower the probability that we assign to a prima facie evil by 80% (0.8) and to increase our confidence in the existence of some logically necessary outweighing good by the correlative amount. This would not be sufficient to undermine the evidential problem for there are vastly many instances of prima facie evil and, given enough of them, the probability that each and every one is outweighed by some greater good becomes vanishingly small.

This argument underscores the importance of two things. First, it shows how, when discussing the evidential problem, it is important not to get bogged down by one or two specific examples (e.g. E1 and E2) and to remember the vastly many instances of prima facie evil that do arise (E1...En).

Second, it shows that Bergmann's brand of skeptical theism is probably the best bet if one wishes to undermine the evidential problem of evil. But this forces us to accept that Bergmann has provided an undercutting defeater for any belief that we may have about something being an all-things-considered good or evil.

So this really is an extreme form of moral skepticism.

That's it for this post. In the next part we will consider whether Bergmann's skepticism is ultimately incoherent.


* From Bergmann, M. "Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil" in Thomas and Rea (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2009) p. 389